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Empirical  studies  have  shown  that  millions  of  individual  users  develop  new  products  and  services  to
serve  their  own  needs.  The  economic  impact  of  this  phenomenon  increases  if  and  as adopters  in  addition
to  the initial  innovators  also  gain  beneﬁts  from  those  user-developed  innovations.  It has  been  argued
that  the  diffusion  of  user-developed  innovations  is negatively  affected  by a new  type  of market  failure:
value  that  others  may  gain  from  a  user-developed  product  can  often  be an  externality  to  consumer-
developers.  As  a result,  consumer  innovators  may  not  invest  in supporting  diffusion  to  the  extent  thatser innovation
ommercial diffusion
eer-to-peer diffusion
eneral value
arket failure
would  be socially  optimal.  In this  paper,  we  utilize  a broad  sample  of consumers  in Finland  to  explore  the
extent to which  innovations  developed  by  individual  users  are  deemed  of  potential  value  to others,  and
the  extent  to  which  they  diffuse  as  a  function  of  perceived  general  value.  Our  empirical  analysis  supports
the  hypothesis  that  a market  failure  is  affecting  the diffusion  of user  innovations  developed  by consumers
for  their  own  use.  Implications  and  possible  remedies  are  discussed.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license. Introduction and overview
Empirical research ﬁnds that tens of millions of citizens spend
ens of billions of dollars annually developing and modifying con-
umer products to better serve their own needs (von Hippel et al.,
011). Driven by the ever-increasing quality of freely available
esign and communication tools, single and collaborative user
nnovation is expected to become even more prominent in the
uture (Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011).
The social welfare beneﬁts of single and collaborative user
nnovation by citizens will be considerably enhanced if citizen-
eveloped innovations of general value diffuse to others who can
eneﬁt from them. However, from microeconomic theory, there is
eason to hypothesize that free, peer-to-peer diffusion of user inno-
ation will be inefﬁciently low from a social welfare perspective.
s von Hippel et al. (2014) have argued, when innovation diffusion
nvolves free revealing rather than market transactions, innova-
∗ Corresponding author. Fax: +1 617 253 2660.
E-mail address: evhippel@mit.edu (E. von Hippel).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.06.015
048-7333/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
tors will ﬁnd the beneﬁts that accrue to adopters to be partially or
entirely an externality from their point of view. As a result, user
innovators can be expected to invest less than might be socially
desirable to inform or assist others to adopt, even when their inno-
vations would be highly valuable to others – a market failure. In
the speciﬁc circumstances focused upon here, we  say that a mar-
ket failure exists if user innovators and adopters, taken together,
would have higher net beneﬁts from the user innovation if the user
innovator invested more in diffusion. This type of market failure is
novel in the innovation literature.
In this paper, we  empirically explore the market failure hypoth-
esis just described via a sample of 176 innovations developed for
personal use by individual consumers in Finland. In overview, we
found that 85% of the consumer developers report that what they
had developed highly satisﬁed their own  needs. Moreover, draw-
ing on multiple questions, we  concluded that, in our respondents’
view, 61% of their innovations are deemed useful to some or many
others. Still, actual commercial and/or peer-to-peer diffusion only
occurred for 19% of the innovations.
We further ﬁnd that effort exerted to achieve peer-to-peer dif-
fusion is not affected by the innovators’ assessment of the general
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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alue of the innovation, and consequently, innovations with higher
erceived value to other users are not more likely to spread to peers
han are low-valued ones. In contrast, commercial diffusion effort
xerted is related to perceived general value. These ﬁndings are in
ine with the existence of a market failure of the type hypothesized
y von Hippel et al. (2014).
Our concluding discussion increases our understanding of its
nner workings and points out avenues for future research as well
s practical implications for policy and business.
. Review of the literature
In this section, we review the literature on the frequency and
mportance of innovation and innovation diffusion by users, the
athways by which user innovations diffuse, users’ incentives to
iffuse their innovations, and the likelihood of diffusion-related
arket failure.
.1. Extent of product development and modiﬁcation by
onsumers
Representative national surveys of citizens above age 18 in the
K, US, and Japan, show that millions of individuals in each of these
ations develop or modify consumer products to better serve their
ersonal needs (von Hippel et al., 2011). In the UK, the fraction
f user innovators was found to be 6.1% of the population, in the
S it was 5.2%, and in Japan it was 3.7%. The scope of consumer
nnovation in all three nations was found to be very broad, ranging
rom improvements to vehicles, to products used in patient home
are, to improvements in sporting products.
In the UK, von Hippel et al. (2012) estimated that consumer-
evelopers on average spent 7.1 days and £1098 out-of-pocket
osts per year. At the macro-level and when evaluating person-days
t average UK workforce salaries, total annual spending by con-
umers on innovation was estimated to £3.2 billion. In comparison,
stimated annual R&D expenditures by companies on consumer
roducts were £2.2 billion. Similar ﬁndings have been reported for
he US and Japan (von Hippel et al., 2011). These ﬁndings show that
oth the scale and scope of user innovation is substantial.
.2. Diffusion pathways
Consumers as user innovators are motivated to create innova-
ions to serve their own  needs – not those of others, and consumer
eeds have been shown to be heterogeneous (Franke and von
ippel, 2003). At the same time, what one consumer requires may
t what another wants better that commercially-available prod-
cts, and so some user innovations may  prove to be of general value.
hen user innovations are valuable to others, diffusion enhances
ocial welfare (Gambardella et al., forthcoming). User innovations
re especially likely to be of general value when they have been
eveloped by ‘lead users’, who are characterized by needs that
oreshadow general demand. Producers who purposefully seek out
nnovations developed by lead users as a basis for commercial prod-
cts have found this to be a proﬁtable practice (Lilien et al., 2002).
The diffusion pathways user innovations might follow are as
hown in Fig. 1 (Baldwin et al., 2006; de Jong and von Hippel, 2013).
t the top of Fig. 1, we see that users who innovate may  choose to
able 1
rotection of and diffusion of user innovations developed by consumers.
Source Country Data year Samp
von Hippel et al. (2012) United Kingdom 2009 104 in
Ogawa and Pongtanalert (2011) USA 2010 114 in
Ogawa and Pongtanalert (2011) Japan 2011 83 innFig. 1. Pathways via which user-developed innovations diffuse.
reveal information regarding their innovations without charge to
other users (peers) interested in adopting them. This diffusion may
be purposeful, or simply be the result of spillovers of unprotected
information, as when a novel product is used by a user innovator
in a public setting (Strandburg, 2008).
Diffusion can also be accomplished less directly, with producers
obtaining information from user innovators so that they can adopt
the innovation (and further develop it if needed) and then offer it to
a broad audience for general sale. As can be seen at the left side of
Fig. 1, the information may  be freely revealed to the producers on
the same terms as it is revealed to adopting users: freely revealed
information has no restrictions upon who  may access it. Or, some
user innovators may  choose to not freely reveal their innovation-
related information but instead receive some kind of compensation
(e.g., pay, royalties, and favors) (de Jong and von Hippel, 2009). Or
alternatively, they may  start their own ﬁrm for that same purpose
(Shah and Tripsas, 2007). In any of these commercial pathways, the
innovation ends up being offered for general sale, and in that way
diffused.
2.3. Prevalence of innovation diffusion by individual users
It has been empirically documented that user innovators may
freely reveal what they have developed, for others to examine, imi-
tate, or modify without any compensation to the innovator. The
practices visible in open source software development were impor-
tant in bringing this phenomenon to general awareness. In these
projects it was clear policy that project contributors would rou-
tinely and systematically freely reveal code they had developed at
private expense (Raymond, 1999). However, free revealing does
not imply that others will adopt what has been freely revealed. In
the case of innovations by individual users, survey evidence shows
that diffusion exists in only a fraction of the identiﬁed cases. As
can be seen in Table 1, the diffusion rate, via commercial and/or
peer-to-peer channels, varies from 5.0% to 17.1%. This is the case
even though, as can also be seen in Table 1, only a small percentage
of individual consumers have legally protected their innovation-
related knowledge as intellectual property.
Note that, on their own, the ﬁgures for diffusion shown in Table 1
are not evidence for under-diffusion. Although, this matter was not
studied prior to the empirical study we will report on here, many
or even most of the innovations in earlier studies may have been
of interest only to the innovating user. In such cases, non-diffusion
is not evidence of a shortfall in investment in diffusion by the user
le Protection with IPRs Diffusion
novations by consumers ≥ 18 years 1.9% 17.1%
novations by consumers ≥ 18 years 8.8% 6.1%
ovations by consumers ≥ 18 years 0.0% 5.0%
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nnovator: it simply is a reﬂection of the expected lack of adopter
nterest. Obviously, diffusion is useful only to the extent that user
nnovations have value to others.
.4. Potential market failure
In general, a market failure exists when another possible out-
ome can make at least one economic actor better off without
aking someone else worse off (Krugman and Wells, 2006). Market
ailures are a form of inefﬁciency that may  call for remedy.
The type of possible market failure that might be associated
ith the diffusion of individual, freely-revealed innovations is that
ndividual users, with no mechanism in place to share the ben-
ﬁts others might reap from adopting their innovations, would
iew potential adopters’ beneﬁts as an externality and so under-
nvest in innovation diffusion from the perspective of social welfare.
o understand the level of diffusion investment that it would be
ocially useful for user innovators to expend, consider the innovat-
ng user and the pool of potential adopters who could beneﬁt from
is or her innovation as an integrated system for which a benev-
lent dictator seeks to maximize the aggregate surplus. Assume
hat investments in the diffusion of innovation-related informa-
ion by innovators will lower the costs for all potential adopters.
ssume also that additional investments by the innovator would
ower adopters’ costs at a declining rate. Aggregate surplus is then
aximized at the point where an additional dollar of investment by
he innovator in diffusion produces an increase of exactly a dollar of
eneﬁt for the entire pool of potential adopters. In other words, that
ocial optimum obtains if the marginal cost of diffusion equals the
arginal beneﬁt derived from it. Of course, individual innovators
ay  obtain non-priced diffusion beneﬁts such as help with innova-
ion development, or reputational beneﬁts, or altruism (Franke and
hah, 2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005). If these are sufﬁciently high,
hey could offset the lack of direct ﬁnancial reward that a mar-
et provides. Whether they do so is a matter requiring empirical
nvestigations of the type conducted in this paper.
This novel form of market failure was ﬁrst described by von
ippel et al. (2014), and an existence proof was provided within
he medical ﬁeld. Here, it was found that clinicians’ efforts to dif-
use valuable discoveries made during their clinical practice was
ery low, and unrelated to the general value of those discoveries.
n this paper, we  broaden the exploration of this potentially very
undamental form of market failure to a much more general cate-
ory of user innovators – a broad sample of citizens in Finland. We
lso explore more deeply the details of cause and consequence.
. Research methods
.1. Sample identiﬁcation
Our research was supported by a grant from Finland’s national
nnovation agency, Tekes. To obtain an initial and representative
ample, we ﬁrst contacted 10,000 individual citizens aged 18–65
ears by telephone to invite them to take an electronic survey.
hese citizens were randomly drawn from Finland’s Population
egister Centre. In order to increase our subsample of validated
ser innovations (see later), we also sought to build a convenience
ample consisting of people whose attributes, based on previous
tudies, made it more likely that they were innovators: highly edu-
ated, technical workers, and males (von Hippel et al., 2011). To this
nd, we invited members of several labor unions whose members
ad these characteristics to participate in our survey (The unions
hose memberships we contacted were: The Union of Professional
ngineers in Finland, the Finnish Inventors National Federation,icy 44 (2015) 1856–1865
Academic Engineers and Architects in Finland, the Trade Union of
Education, AKAVA, SEFE, and The Finnish Metalworkers’ Union).
All invitations were issued between August, 2012 and January,
2013. Each invitee was sent a hyperlink so that she/he could ﬁnd
the survey and participate. To avoid duplication, respondents were
asked to ﬁll in the surveys at their home address. Each respondent
was allowed to complete the survey only once; to ensure this, our
software recorded each respondent’s IP address.
Completed questionnaires were obtained from 2048 Finnish
citizens. The representative and likely user innovator subsamples
contained 993 and 1055 respondents, respectively. We combined
these into an overall sample, as exploratory t-tests and 2-tests
showed that none of the key variables in our study (reported later)
signiﬁcantly differed between the two samples. With respect to
demographic characteristics, 58% of the respondents in the overall
sample were male. Forty one percent had a bachelors, masters or
Ph.D. degree, and 46% worked in a technical job or business (e.g.,
engineering, medicine, natural sciences, design, and IT). Respon-
dents’ average age was  44.9 years at the time of the survey, and 86%
were employed (including self-employed and business owners).
3.2. Sample screening
To identify respondents who  had engaged in user innovation, we
applied a reﬁned version of a procedure initially developed in the
United Kingdom (von Hippel et al., 2012). The screening procedure
ﬁrst casts a broad net to increase the chance of capturing any prod-
uct developments or modiﬁcations of respondents. Then, careful
screening is applied to eliminate any false positives captured.
At the start of our questionnaire we  stated: “The following
questions relate to any creative activities in your leisure time. You
may have created any products or applications for personal use, to
help other people, to learn or just for fun”. Respondents’ recall was
assisted by offering a list of nine speciﬁc cues: had they created
any (1) computer software; (2) household ﬁxtures or furnishing;
(3) vehicle-related; (4) tools or equipment; (5) sports, hobby or
entertainment; (6) child or education-related; (7) health, care or
medical; (8) food or clothing; or (9) any other items. We  asked if
respondents had created any of these items for personal use in the
past three years.
Out of the 2048 respondents, initially 624 reported at least one
creation with respect to the nine aforementioned cues. We  next
applied two  screening questions as one step in our validation pro-
cess. We  asked (1) whether the respondent knew of an equivalent
product available on the market that he/she could have bought;
and (2) whether the innovation had been developed as part of the
respondent’s job. A positive answer to either question eliminated
the claimed innovation from further consideration. We were not
interested in replications of existing products, but rather aimed
for creations/modiﬁcations that were at least new to the consumer
him/herself. We  also wanted to include only innovations that indi-
viduals had developed as consumers rather than as business sector
employees. Application of these screens reduced our 624 afﬁrma-
tive replies to 251 potential innovators.
Next, the survey script asked respondents to describe their
development and its intended function. These open-ended descrip-
tions were examined and discussed by two  members of the
research team. Cases regarded as false positives due to lack of
novel, user-developed content such as: “I installed a [manufacturer-
developed] software upgrade on my personal computer”  were
removed at this stage. When no description was  provided, we took
the respondent’s claims as correct (e.g., “I am too afraid to reveal it.
[But] the problem I had almost on a daily basis is now solved!”).
Finally, we  only included innovations into our sample that pro-
duced some level of functional novelty. This included developments
that were a customized version of existing products that were not
J.P.J. de Jong et al. / Research Pol
Table  2
Objects of validated user innovations, and examples (n = 176).
Object Freq. Examples
Tools & equipment 20% A tool that helps to change
tyres with less back pain. There
are no similar products on the
market. This one is for personal
use.
Household ﬁxtures & furnishing 20% A foldaway bathtub. I am
having a small bathroom and
wanted to avoid big and
expensive renovation work.
Sports, hobby & entertainment 17% New device for bee keeping,
helps lifting the compartments
of the beehive. This is usually
heavy lifting which needs to be
done by two persons, but not
anymore.
Food and clothing 12% A hamburger mold that I could
not ﬁnd in the shops. I wanted
extra large hamburgers, but
the tools were not available.
Transport & vehicle 11% I have made my own stunt bike
foot rests. They are much
stronger, lighter and safer than
available commercial products
Help, care & medical 7% Tools to help my  brother who
is disabled and who  can only
use one arm. He can now peel,
dice and slice and work with
anything from bread to fruit
with one hand.
Computer software 6% Software that is able to take
screenshots simultaneously
from several cameras. I like to
see what happens in my  street.
Children & education 4% A seat belt control that guides
the belt to come down over the
collarbone/shoulder and not
for example over the throat.
My  child does not get
frustrated anymore when the
seatbelt is in his face. He no
longer wears it only partly, e.g.
only on the hip, so it is safer.
Other 3% A cylinder woven of acid-proof
steel net to neutralize well
water. The cylinder is ﬁlled
with dolomite lime grains and
lowered down into the well.
The pH-value of the well water
rises and therefore the life of
the piping and plumbing
ﬁxtures will increase. Existing
products did not match with
my  situation.
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the innovator’s perception of the cost and difﬁculty for others toTotal 100%
vailable on the market, and that provided important value for
he developer. It excluded purely aesthetic improvements, as in: “I
ainted a picture more appropriate to my  setting than any available”.
This is a restriction that future researchers may  want to revisit:
n effect, all purely artistic innovation is excluded). After the com-
letion of our screening process, we had a sample of 176 validated
nnovations. Table 2 provides their frequencies and some examples.
.3. Variables
As we explained earlier on, our major goal is to explore the rela-
ionships between the value associated with product innovations
eveloped by citizens for others, the extent to which respondents
ad made an effort to diffuse their innovations commercially and/or
eer to peer, and how often commercial and/or peer-to-peer dif-icy 44 (2015) 1856–1865 1859
fusion had been observed. Table 3 provides an overview of the
variables in the analyses we will present later.
First, in the survey we asked respondents if, as far as they could
assess, diffusion of their innovation had occurred. Commercial dif-
fusion was measured with a dichotomous indicator – ‘yes’ if the
innovation was commercialized either by a venture or an exist-
ing commercial producer – otherwise ‘no’. Similarly, peer-to-peer
diffusion was  measured with a dichotomous indicator – ‘yes’ if the
innovation was  adopted by other individual users, – otherwise ‘no’.
Next, we  asked whether the innovator had made an effort to dif-
fuse his/her innovation. Diffusion effort via commercial pathways
was indicated if he/she had shown the innovation to a business or
entrepreneur. Diffusion effort to peers was indicated if he/she had
revealed the innovation to other individuals.
With respect to value created by the innovations, we ﬁrst asked
respondents whether or not their innovation had served their own
needs. Next, we asked four questions (shown in Table 3) to deter-
mine to what extent each innovator thought his or her innovation
could also serve the needs of others. A principal component anal-
ysis then was applied (details available on request). This showed
that the four questions could be condensed into a single dimension,
and we saved the resulting factor-score as an indicator of perceived
general value.
As an independent check on the validity of innovators’ self-
assessment of general value, we provided three independent coders
with the open-ended descriptions of all innovations in our vali-
dated sample. Based on these descriptions, each of these individuals
coded the innovations as having value to: no, few, or many other
consumers. Cohen’s kappa was  calculated to be 0.45, indicating
fair or moderate agreement among the coders (Landis and Koch,
1977; Cicchetti, 1994). We  next computed the average score of the
three coders to obtain an independent measure of general value.
This measure was  positively and signiﬁcantly related to self-rated
general value provided by the innovators (r = .37, p < .001).
Our independent coders thus provide support for the validity
of the self-rated general value measure provided by our sample
of innovators. However, of the two available measures, we elected
to use the innovators’ self-rating in further analyses. We  reasoned
that the self-rating, although suffering from potential biases to
be discussed in Section 5.2, is likely to be the most accurate one.
Consider that, for most innovations, the open-ended descriptions
relied upon by the independent coders were not very detailed. By
comparison, the innovators themselves have much richer informa-
tion on the nature of their innovations. In addition, the innovators’
assessment of general value was made after their innovations were
completed, put to use, and perhaps also observed by others. Self-
rating accuracy should therefore be additionally enhanced by this
post-innovation information – which was  available to the innova-
tors but not to the independent coders.
Other variables in Table 3 were included in the regression anal-
yses we present later to investigate the correlates of diffusion via
commercial pathways or peer-to-peer. We  included respondents’
educational attainment (dummy  for those with at least a bache-
lor degree). We  also included motives for innovating, which were
measured by distributing 100 points over ﬁve pre-deﬁned motives
(taken from Hienerth et al., 2014). Three dummy variables were
included indicating collaboration partners if they were involved,
reasoning that such innovations more likely diffuse. We also added
respondents’ willingness to freely share their innovation-related
knowledge with at least some others, and, likewise, a dummy  indi-
cating if the respondent was willing to share for some kind of
compensation. Finally, we included two count variables regardingadopt their innovation. Adoption may  require that adopters invest
from a little to a lot of time or money to understand, replicate, and
apply an innovation.
1860 J.P.J. de Jong et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1856–1865
Table 3
Variables.
Variable Description Values
Commercial diffusion Innovation was  commercialized in a venture or adopted by a producer for general
sale
0 = no; 1 = yes
Peer  diffusion Innovation was  adopted by other users for non-commercial purposes 0 = no; 1 = yes
Diffusion effort: commercial Innovator showed the innovation to a business or entrepreneur 0 = no; 1 = yes
Diffusion effort: to peers Innovator revealed the innovation to other individuals 0 = no; 1 = yes
Personal value Response to the item, ‘this innovation worked for me,  it solved my  personal need.’ 1 (barely/not at all)–4 (perfectly)
General  value Factor-score of four indicators listed below (standardized alpha = .75; mean r = .42,
IRCs  > = .50; variance explained 57%)
Range: −1.48–2.25
..This innovation would be of value to other people (1 = to none, 2 = to few, 3 = to
many, 4 = to (nearly) all)
..I think this innovation can become a valuable commercial product (1 = not, 2 = to
a  small market, 3 = to a reasonable market, 4 = to a substantial market)
..My innovation would enable other people to do something they could not do
before (0 = no, 1 = yes)
..My innovation would help other people to save money (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Education Dummy  variable for those with at least a bachelor degree 0 = no; 1 = yes
Motives: Innovator’s motives to develop the innovation, with importance indicated by
distributing 100 points across. . .
Personal need ..I personally needed it 0–100 points
Sales ..I wanted to sell it/make money 0–100 points
Learning ..I wanted to learn/develop my  skills 0–100 points
Helping ..I was  helping other people 0–100 points
Enjoyment ..I did it for the fun of doing it 0–100 points
Collaboration: Innovation was  developed in collaboration with others. . .
Relatives/friends ..Relatives/friends 0 = no; 1 = yes
Business ..Businesses/producers 0 = no; 1 = yes
Club/community ..Members of a community or club 0 = no; 1 = yes
Willingness to freely reveal Innovator is willing to freely share his/her innovation-related knowledge 0 = no; 1 = yes
Willingness to trade Innovator is willing to reveal his/her innovation-related for a compensation (e.g.,
money, royalties, favors, and discounts)
0 = no; 1 = yes
Commercial adoption barriers Count variable of three types of adoption costs for commercial adopters (required
learning effort, time/money investment, or any other)
0–3 barriers
Peer  adoption barriers Count variable of three types of adoption costs for peers/other users (required
, or any other)
0–3 barriers
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Table 4
Extent of consumer innovation and diffusion in Finland.
Finlanda (n = 993)
Percentage of consumers who  developed
or modiﬁed a consumer product in the
previous three years. . .
.  . .In the general population aged 18 and
over (for Finland, aged 18–65)
5.4%
. . .Amongst highly educated (at least
bachelor degree)
7.7%
.  . .Amongst those in a technical job or
business
8.8%
. . .Amongst males 6.3%
Estimated number of consumer innovators
aged 18 and over (for Finland, aged 18–65)
0.17 million
Diffusion: percentage of consumer
innovations. . .
.  . .Protected with IPRs 4.7%
.  . .Actual diffusion to peers and/or
commercially
19.0%
a Via a comparison with population statistics for 2012 obtained from Statistics
Finland, we  found that males, younger citizens aged 18–24, and those with onlylearning effort, time/money investment
. Findings
We  start with overall study ﬁndings (Section 4.1). We  next
xplore the value that innovating consumers derive from their
nnovations, and from the process of developing them, as well as
erceived value to others (Section 4.2). We  then explore levels of
iffusion across different levels of perceived general value of the
nnovations (Section 4.3). Next, our main analysis is concerned with
he factors associated with commercial and peer-to-peer diffusion
Section 4.4).
.1. Frequency and nature of user innovation by consumers in
inland
Our ﬁrst analyses focused on our subsample of 993 respondents
ho had been drawn at random and recruited on the phone. We
stimate that in Finland, 5.4% of the consumer population aged
8–65 years has engaged in user innovation in the past three years
5.9% in the unweighted sample—see Table 4 notes).
With respect to diffusion-related matters, we see in Table 4 that
nly a small fraction of consumer innovators protect their innova-
ions from copying via intellectual property rights. We  also see that
nly 19% of the consumer-developed innovations diffuse. As can be
een in Table 1, these ﬁndings are similar to ﬁndings obtained in
he UK, the US, and Japan. Recall that, on their own, the ﬁgures for
iffusion shown in Table 1 are not evidence for under-diffusion.
onsumer innovators that seek to serve their own  needs may  only
ometimes develop innovations that are of potential interest to
thers as well. Diffusion is beneﬁcial only to the extent that user
nnovations have value to others.primary education were under-represented. This sampling bias was corrected for by
computing weights for all respondents across all combinations of gender, education
and  age classes (details available on request).
4.2. Personal and general value of innovations
With respect to personal utility, most respondents reported
being highly satisﬁed with the use value of their innovation. In our
combined sample of 176 validated innovations, 85% of the devel-
opers reported that their innovation very well or perfectly solved
their own personal needs. More speciﬁcally, their response distri-
bution to the statement. ‘The innovation worked for me, it solved
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Table  5
Perceived general value of user innovations by consumers.
General value This innovation. . .
...Helps other
people to save
money (yes)
...Enables people to do new
things (yes)
...Would be valuable to others
(many or nearly all)
...Can become a valuable
commercial product (to a
reasonable/substantial market)
Cluster I: valuable to many (17%) 70% 67% 74% 93%
Cluster II: valuable to some (44%) 66% 68% 42% 0%
Cluster III: valuable to none (39%) 0% 0% 0% 3%
Note: Percentages in cells based on 30, 77 and 69 validated innovations for cluster I, II and III, respectively.
Table 6
Diffusion of innovations and diffusion effort across clusters of general value.
Perceived general value Diffusion of innovations Diffusion effort
Any type Peer-to-peer Commercial To peers Commercially
Cluster I: valuable to many 19% 12% 15% 23% 19%
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Total 19% 16% 
y  personal need’ was ‘barely or not at all’ (3%), ‘somewhat’ (12%),
very well’ (43%) and ‘perfectly’ (42%).
We next asked innovating respondents about the extent to
hich they thought that others would ﬁnd their innovations valu-
ble. Recall from Section 3 that four indicators, shown in Table 5,
ere used to assess general value. Utilizing data collected for these
ndicators, we applied cluster analysis to our sample. Classiﬁca-
ion was obtained using the two-step cluster procedure suggested
y Milligan and Sokol (1980). First, hierarchical clustering based
n Ward’s method with squared Euclidian distances was  applied
o group the reported innovations into homogeneous clusters. To
ssess the robustness of various cluster options, we  saved a range of
nitial solutions with two to ﬁve clusters. In a second step we pro-
eeded with k-means cluster analyses, using the initial hierarchical
olutions as starting values. Coefﬁcient Kappa (chance-corrected
oefﬁcient of agreement) between each initial and iterated solu-
ion (cf. Singh, 1990) then indicated that a three-cluster solution
as optimal (k = .94).
Note from Table 5 that 17% of the innovation cases are self-
ssessed by the innovators ‘likely to be useful to many’ (Cluster
) and 44% are ‘likely to be useful to some’ (Cluster II). This is a
ery interesting ﬁnding – ﬁrst of kind – with respect to the social
elfare potential of consumer innovation. It is in principle possible
hat very few consumer-developed innovations would be of inter-
st to others, due to high heterogeneity of user need that has been
ound among consumers (Franke and Reisinger, 2003; Franke and
on Hippel, 2003). Or, it is possible that, despite high heterogeneity
f need, user-developed innovations will in many cases be a good or
etter ﬁt to the needs of others than available commercial options.
mpirical ﬁndings such as the ones described here are needed to
nderstand this matter.
An illustrative example of an innovation in Cluster 1, ‘likely to
e useful to many’, is “I am suffering from aching feet. My  device is
ifferent from the ones available on the markets. It gives massage on
0–100 pressure points, simultaneously or as a wave, based on simple
rocessor-guided program. The novelty value is based on massage that
an be adjusted easily according to my needs. It can imitate acupunc-
ure without puncturing my skin”. An example of an innovation in
luster 3, ‘likely valuable to none beyond the innovator’ was  “I work
n the garage and there is often need for tools that are not available on
he markets. For example, I developed a drill and sleeve combination
hat helps in getting broken 8 mm bolt out of a 5 cm deep hole. Hardly
ewsworthy, these novel tools assist me  in my own activities”.9% 21% 6%
0% 12% 0%
6% 18% 6%
4.3. Levels of diffusion
In Table 6, we see initial evidence compatible with a market
failure with respect to the peer-to-peer diffusion of innovations
developed by individuals in Finland. Overall, as can be seen, only
a minority of innovations deemed to be of value to others did in
fact diffuse, and diffusion effort was  seldom exerted by innovating
individuals.
In the case of peer-to-peer diffusion, we ﬁnd that there is no
signiﬁcant relationship between the likelihood of diffusion and the
general value of the innovation (2 = .8 with df = 2, p = .646). In addi-
tion, there was  no signiﬁcant relationship between the likelihood
that innovators were making an effort to diffuse to peers (by reveal-
ing their innovation to other potential users) and the general value
of the innovation (2 = 2.5 with df = 2, p = .285). Both ﬁndings are in
line with the presence of a market failure in the case of peer-to-peer
diffusion. If the value of an innovation to others is entirely an exter-
nality for individual innovators, there is no reason that diffusion
effort should be correlated with the general value of the innovation.
In the case of diffusion to commercial ﬁrms, things are differ-
ent. Here, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the likelihood
of diffusion and the perceived general value of an innovation as
assessed by the individual innovator (2 = 8.0 with df = 2, p = .018).
There is also a relationship between effort to diffuse commercially
and higher perceived general value (2 = 12.2 with df = 2, p = .002).
These ﬁndings are in line with the existence of a market failure
affecting peer-to-peer diffusion effort and diffusion accomplish-
ment in the case of innovations developed by individual user
innovators. In contrast, the failure appears to be mitigated in the
case of commercial diffusion effort of innovations developed by
individuals.
4.4. Factors distinguishing diffusing from non-diffusing
innovations
Next, we explore whether the relationships between perceived
general value, diffusion and diffusion effort are conﬁrmed in a more
elaborative multivariate framework. As will be seen, in this frame-
work we included as control variables educational attainment,
innovation motives, external collaboration indicators, willingness
to freely reveal or trade innovations, and perceived adoption bar-
riers. This increased richness enabled us to more broadly assess
factors distinguishing diffusing from non-diffusing innovations.
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able 7 provides descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations.
e  estimated four probit regression models, as shown in Table 8,
hich due to the cross-sectional nature of our data should be
nterpreted in correlational and not causal terms. To ease the
nterpretation of signiﬁcant effects we report marginal effect
arameters. Variance inﬂation factors of the probit models did not
xceed 2.0, indicating that multicollinearity was not present.
The ﬁrst regression was signiﬁcant and helpful to explain diffu-
ion via commercial pathways (2 = 28.8 with df = 12, p = .004).
e excluded willingness to trade as an independent variable: for
ll cases that had diffused commercially the innovator was  willing
o transfer his/her knowledge for a compensation. This suggests
hat such willingness is a necessity for commercial diffusion to
ccur. The marginal effect estimates showed that after includ-
ng the control variables, general value is still positively related
ith commercial diffusion. In addition, educational attainment was
arginally signiﬁcant.
With respect to the effect of general value on commercial dif-
usion, our estimates suggest that one additional unit of general
alue (i.e., a standard deviation, as general value is a standardized
actor-score) increases the probability of commercial diffusion by
.8%. Given the estimated baseline probability of 6.3%, at high levels
f perceived general value the probability of commercial diffusion
lmost doubles.
The third model in Table 8 explores the correlates of innova-
ors’ effort to diffuse commercially. Again, willingness to trade was
ot included, as it perfectly correlated with the dependent vari-
ble. Overall model ﬁt was even stronger compared to the ﬁrst
odel (2 = 35.6 with df = 12, p = .000). After entering the con-
rol variables the relationship between perceived general value and
ommercial diffusion effort was still signiﬁcant.
At high levels of general value (one standard deviation above its
ean score) the probability of exerting commercial diffusion effort
ncreases by 4.5%. Moreover, we found that innovators were more
ikely to exert commercial diffusion effort when their innovation
otive was sales related, when the innovation was developed in
ollaboration with club or community members, and at high lev-
ls of personal use value. Overall, these observations conﬁrm that
nnovations with high general value are more likely to spread if a
arket incentive is operating.
The second model in Table 8 explains the correlates of accom-
lished diffusion to peers, that is, to other users. After including
he control variables we ﬁnd that perceived general value is not
elated with peer-to-peer diffusion, echoing Table 6. Only innova-
ors’ willingness to freely reveal their innovation seems to increase
he probability that innovations spread to other users. However,
verall model ﬁt is not signiﬁcant (2 = 15.0 with df = 13, p > .10)
ndicating that our ability to explain peer-to-peer diffusion is lim-
ted.
Model ﬁt was acceptable in the fourth model, in which peer dif-
usion effort was the dependent variable (2 = 23.7 with df = 13,
 = .032). Here, we again ﬁnd that a relationship between general
alue and peer diffusion effort is lacking, which is in line with
he market failure we proposed. Rather, innovations developed in
ollaboration with others are more likely to be shown to other
ndividuals.
. Discussion
In this study, we have extensively analyzed the relationship
etween the perceived general value of user innovations, the extent
o which they diffuse, and the extent to which effort is exerted by
ser innovators to support diffusion. Our goal has been to inves-
igate the merit of the “under-diffusion of user innovation due to
arket failure” hypothesis (von Hippel et al., 2014), and to explore Ta
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Table  8
Probit regression models of diffusion, and diffusion effort (n = 176).
Diffusion observed Diffusion effort
Commercial Peer-to-peer Commercial Peer-to-peer
dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Baseline estimate .063 .164 .060 .176
Effect parameters:
Education .055  ˆ (.033) −.064 (.054) −.045 (.031) −.043 (.058)
Motive: sales −.001 (.003) .002 (.005) .005* (.002) −.001 (.004)
Motive: learning .000 (.001) .002 (.003) −.001 (.001) .005* (.002)
Motive: helping −.000 (.001) .000 (.001) .000 (.000) .000 (.001)
Motive: enjoyment −.000 (.001) .000 (.002) .000 (.001) .003 (.002)
Collaboration: relatives/friends −.005 (.041) .009 (.069) −.027 (.033) .141* (.069)
Collaboration: business .059 (.077) .248 (.178) .002 (.044) .442* (.175)
Collaboration: club/community −.024 (.041) .336 (.212) .448* (.187) .362 (.215)
Willingness to freely reveal −.050 (.062) .157** (.047) .002 (.045) .080 (.082)
Willingness to trade −.175 (.138) .100 (.091)
Commercial adoption barriers .047 (.035) −.029 (.036)
Peer adoption barriers .027 (.063) −.121 (.072)
Personal value −.006 (.018) .012 (.035) .057** (.021) .041 (.034)
General value .058* (.023) .007 (.033) .045* (.018) .045 (.031)
Model ﬁt:
Wald 2 (df) 28.8 (12) 15.0 (13) 35.6 (12) 23.7 (13)
Signiﬁcance (Wald p-value) .004 .304 .000 .032
N  is the
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oPseudo R2 .299 .090
ote: Robust standard errors in parentheses. For innovation motives, personal need
actors affecting it. Our analyses were based on a broad sample of
onsumers in Finland.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the evidence in favor
f the under-diffusion of consumer innovation hypothesis. Then,
e discuss the limitations of our study and offer suggestions for fur-
her research. Finally, we consider whether anything can be done to
ncrease diffusion of generally valuable innovations that consumers
evelop.
.1. Evaluating the market failure hypothesis
The market failure hypothesis proposed in von Hippel et al.
2014) offers a reason why generally valuable user innovations
ight not diffuse. We  ﬁnd that their hypothesis is in line with our
mpirical ﬁndings.
Unlike producers, consumers develop innovations for them-
elves primarily – and there is no necessary reason why  consumer
reations would also offer value to others. Nonetheless, we found
hat 61% of user innovations were believed by their developers to
e valuable to at least some other users – and so to be a poten-
ial source of broader social and economic value. Of course, this
roader value is only realized to the extent that the innovations
ctually diffuse. In line with the market failure hypothesis we  have
xplored in this paper, we found that few innovators exert an effort
o diffuse their innovations commercially or to other users. Only 6%
eported that they had exerted effort to show their innovation to an
ntrepreneur or business for general sale, while 18% had revealed
heir innovation to other individuals. As for observed diffusion, 16%
f the consumer-developed innovations did diffuse peer to peer,
hile 6% diffused via commercial pathways.
Notably, innovators’ reason for not trying to diffuse cannot have
een a wish to protect their idea, e.g., for reasons of rivalry with
ther users. Very few respondents had applied for intellectual prop-
rty rights, and 84% of the innovators said they were willing to
reely reveal their innovation. The situation can be explained by
he lack of a connection between the beneﬁts obtained by adopters
nd any investments by consumer innovators to diffuse their inno-
ations. Adopters’ beneﬁts are an externality from the perspective
f consumer innovators who freely reveal..415 .170
 reference group. Two-tailed signiﬁcance ** p < .01, * p < .05, ˆp < .10.
Taking at face value the innovator’s subjective assessment of the
value of the innovation to others, we can say that the innovator’s
decision not to share is individually rational, but socially inefﬁcient.
Others would beneﬁt, in the innovator’s own assessment, if she/he
decided to share more; and yet she/he does not do so. Findings from
the probit regressions presented above clearly show that diffusion
effort to peers, and diffusion accomplished to peers, are not related
to perceived general value. No matter what value the innovator
believes his innovation to have for others, diffusion is unaffected.
This disconnect indicates an externality as the root cause: value to
others is not internalized and therefore not factored into diffusion
effort decision-making.
By contrast, we  ﬁnd that in the presence of a market incentive,
innovators are more likely to put effort into diffusion. In the case
of the commercial diffusion pathway, the market failure we have
documented in the case of peer-to-peer diffusion seemed reduced
in intensity. This is reasonable, given that a market incentives link
can then sometimes exist to reward even innovators who freely
reveal their innovations.
5.2. Limitations and suggestions for further research
This study has limitations that should be dealt with in future
research. We  describe three below which all arise from the fact that
our research utilized the innovators’ own perception of the general
value of their innovation, rather than relying upon the evaluations
of independent raters. We  feel there are beneﬁts from this choice,
but it is also true that reliance on innovators’ self-evaluations does
introduce some potential problems.
On the beneﬁts side, it is important to understand that the inno-
vators’ view – however, imperfect – is precisely the one needed
for our analysis of possible market failure. The market failure we
explore rests on whether innovating users think their innovations
are or are not of general value, and whether their view on this mat-
ter affects the effort they devote effort to diffusion. As we have
seen, this connection is not signiﬁcantly present in the case of peer-
to-peer diffusion, which is consistent with a diagnosis of market
failure.
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At the same time, the actual social loss resulting from this
arket failure depends upon the innovators’ evaluations of the gen-
ral value of their innovations being partially or entirely accurate.
nnovators’ ratings may  have built-in biases, such as systematic
verestimates of general value arising from self-serving bias. To
he extent that is the case, the value of increased diffusion effort
y user innovators would be lessened. The literature to date tenta-
ively suggests that user innovators’ assessments of general value
re valid (Morrison et al., 2000; Poetz and Schreier, 2012), but fur-
her research on this issue seems warranted.
A second issue, which should not be confounded with the con-
iderations just above, is that innovators might, due to a social
esirability bias, exaggerate the value of their creations in their
esponses. If this were the case, their diffusion effort might be tied
o their true perceptions of general value rather than the general
alue estimates they report in our survey. Lower true assessments
f general value would be an alternative explanation for the low lev-
ls of investment that we found in our research, and have attributed
o market failure. This effect will occur only if and to the extent
hat user innovators think it is socially desirable to be known as
he developer of a generally useful innovation versus one that is
ess generally useful. Research on social desirability bias suggests
hat our data collection approach insulates our ﬁndings from this
roblem. It conveyed a high sense of neutrality as respondents
elf-administered our online questionnaire without an interviewer
eing present; they were assured of the full anonymity of their
esponses, and allowed to backtrack (Nederhof, 1985). Under these
onditions distortions due to social desirability have been found to
e small (Richman et al., 1999).
A third issue is also related to the relationship we ﬁnd in our
tudy between diffusion effort and perceived general value: it is
onceivable that causality might run at least partially the other
ay. That is, it may  be that when innovations are of general value,
nnovators will get a signal that this is the case from others. This
ignal may  then stimulate the innovators to increase their diffu-
ion efforts. However, even if this is the case, it is not a concern
ith respect to our main ﬁndings regarding market failure. Recall
hat, in our exploration of a potential market failure, what we are
ooking for is evidence for any connection between the innovators’
iew of marketplace demand and his or her diffusion effort. We  are
gnostic as to the type of information the innovator uses to assess
arketplace demand.
Beyond further in-depth investigation of the market failure
ypothesis, it would be worthwhile for future research to quantify
he loss the social welfare arising from it. In addition, it would be
mportant to understand mitigating factors and the extent to which
hey can remedy the market failure. Such mitigating factors need
ot be market-based, involving ﬁnancial compensation from con-
umer or commercial adopters to consumer innovators, but could
lso involve other rewards in the form of, e.g., recognition or assis-
ance. After all, recognizing a market failure becomes particularly
seful if and when we ﬁnd that there are viable ways to improve the
fﬁciency of the outcome, i.e., mechanisms and measures that will
essen its negative impact on social welfare at a reasonable cost.
With regard to future research on user and open innovation,
e suggest that more attention be given to the dissemination and
euse of innovations made by consumers – either by peers or by
roducer ﬁrms. While studying consumer innovation incidence and
ts antecedents is important, diffusion is a powerful multiplier that
s, as yet, comparatively little understood.
.3. Implications for policy and managerial practiceDespite the relatively low diffusion percentages found in our
ample, it is important to note that even such low percentages can
e a major contributor to the total pool of commercialized innova-icy 44 (2015) 1856–1865
tions. Speciﬁcally in Finland, given our estimated 5.4% of the Finnish
population of consumers aged 18–65 who  can be considered user
innovators, we  have 173,000 innovators among 3.2 million Finnish
citizens. If 6% of their innovations are commercialized for general
sale, this represents 10,380 user-developed products and product
improvements commercialized every three years.
With respect to policymaking to address market failures of the
type explored in this study, note that it has been shown that user
innovation by individuals enhances social welfare (Gambardella
et al., forthcoming). Given this, there is clearly a case for policy sup-
port. After all, policy has been extensively deployed to address the
market failure of spillovers of information from privately ﬁnanced
producer innovation efforts that affect producers. A level playing
ﬁeld would require policymaking to solve market failures in the
development and diffusion of consumer innovation as well.
With respect to enhancement of peer-to-peer diffusion, one
approach – support of collaborative innovation – seems to us to
be especially interesting. Our sample mainly consisted of individ-
ual user innovators. An alternative model of innovation revolves
around individuals who  innovate collaboratively (Baldwin and von
Hippel, 2011). When collaboration is involved, investments to
diffuse partial and full solutions must be taken ‘anyway’ to col-
laborators involved in the work, in the course of the innovation
process itself. Receiving help from other users reduces innovation
costs, because the entire value of in-house use is captured by each
participant, while innovation costs are shared (Baldwin and von
Hippel, 2011). For this reason, in the case of collaborative work,
diffusion efforts generated to support collaboration may simulta-
neously serve both innovators and free riding adopters as well.
Recall from Table 8 that our regression ﬁndings do show that
collaboration is correlated with innovators’ efforts to diffuse both
commercially and to peers. Ogawa and Pongtanalert (2013) simi-
larly found that when individuals belonged to communities with
a shared interest in the innovation they developed, the adoption
rate by peers was  48.5%. In contrast, when users did not belong
to such communities, the adoption rate was sharply lower at
13.3%. Other literature supports these patterns: community users
tend to collaborate with and assist one another (Franke and Shah,
2003; Raymond, 1999) and they tend to share information with
other members, including information about innovations they have
developed (Morrison et al., 2000; Raasch et al., 2008).
Based on this evidence, practitioners and policy-makers seem
well advised to explore how to increase the likelihood that sin-
gle innovators would join into collaborative innovation projects.
Examples of possibly useful measures are increased availability
of innovation facilities that involve social interaction like mak-
erspaces. Also likely to be helpful, would be increased availability
of on-line community fora where people with similar needs and
innovation interests could ﬁnd each other at low cost. Examples
are social sites focused on patients with speciﬁc diseases, and sites
focused on individuals who  share an interest in speciﬁc sports.
Finally, our descriptive ﬁnding (see Table 6) whereby few
innovators undertake an effort to diffuse their innovations com-
mercially deserves attention by managers and policy-makers. It
may  be that means can be found to increase users’ understand-
ing of the general value that their innovations may  have and in this
way increase their incentives to engage in commercial diffusion.
Such market research is a routine part of producer development
efforts, but innovating consumers, responding to their own  needs,
generally do not invest in it prior to innovation development. It
may be that general information regarding potential marketplace
demand can be organized in a way  that is freely accessible to con-
sumer innovators. Established ﬁrms seeking to adopt user designs
of potential commercial value would seem to have an incentive to
make such information available, along with other forms of inno-
vation assistance (Gambardella et al., forthcoming).
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.4. Summing up
The market failure explored in this study – no or “too low” incen-
ives on the part of consumer innovators to diffuse their innovations
 appears to be both important and actionable, creating opportuni-
ies for additional research, and also for adjustments to innovation
olicy and practice.
Beyond the speciﬁc suggestions made here, there is clearly a
reat deal of work and learning available on the topic of market
ailures in user innovation. We  greatly look forward to next steps
nd future learnings regarding theory, policymaking, and practice.
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